Explaining Deviations from the Fifty Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation by Kessler, Daniel P. et al.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
1995
Explaining Deviations from the Fifty Percent Rule:
A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases
for Litigation
Daniel P. Kessler
Thomas Meites
Geoffrey P. Miller
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel P. Kessler, Thomas Meites & Geoffrey P. Miller, "Explaining Deviations from the Fifty Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to
the Selection of Cases for Litigation" (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 31, 1995).
EXPLAINING DEVIATIONS FROM THE 
FIFTY-PERCENT RULE: A MULTIMODAL 
APPROACH TO THE SELECTION OF 
CASES FOR LITIGATION 
DANIEL KESSLER, THOMAS MEITES, AND GEOFFREY MILLER* 
ABSTRACT 
In their 1984 article, Priest and Klein show that a simple divergent expectations 
model of the decision to litigate leads to a plaintiff success rate at trial that 
approaches 50 percent as the fraction of cases going to trial approaches zero. 
However, an extensive empirical literature has documented that plaintiffs win far 
fewer than half of their cases. As Priest and Klein observe, this conflict between 
the predictions of the model and the empirical literature may be attributable to 
violations in the data of the assumptions behind the simple model. Based on data 
from 3,529 cases, we find that "multimodal" case characteristics associated with 
violations of these assumptions cause plaintiff win rates to deviate from the 50- 
percent baseline in the manner that simple law-and-economics models would 
suggest. In other words, among cases that conform more closely to the assump- 
tions underlying the simple divergent expectations model, the plaintiff win rate 
is closer to 50 percent. 
FEW results in the law and economics of litigation have sparked as 
much interest as the hypothesis, associated with a seminal article by 
Priest and Klein, that states that plaintiff win rates at trial approach 50 
percent as the fraction of cases going to trial approaches zero.' The "50 
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Under certain assumptions discussed below. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The 
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1984); and George L. Priest, 
Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman's Mistakes, 14 J. Legal 
Stud. 215 (1985). 
The "50 percent rule" is actually a limiting implication of a "selection effect," in which 
the cases selected for litigation are the difficult and uncertain ones. Selection effects are 
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percent rule" is discussed in major books on law and economics,2 has 
been relied on by law-and-economics scholars as a step in the analysis 
of other issues,3 and has even been showcased by a law and economics 
scholar as a reason why scholars in other disciplines ought to take law 
and economics seriously.4 
The 50 percent rule is actually a limiting implication of a selection 
effect that arises out of a simple divergent expectations model of the 
decision to litigate. In that model, each party estimates the quality of the 
plaintiff's claim with error, and the plaintiff settles when the defendant's 
offer is at least as large as the plaintiff's estimate of the value of her 
claim. Priest and Klein observe that cases selected for litigation are likely 
to be the difficult and uncertain ones-that is, the cases in which the true 
quality of the claim is close to the quality level needed for the plaintiff 
to win if the claim were to be tried-because the clear-cut cases will be 
more likely to settle before trial (or may never evolve into filed cases at 
all). The difficult and uncertain cases, in turn, are likely to be those that, 
on average, result in about half the victories going to one party and about 
half to the other.5 
Although recent empirical work has validated the selection hypothesis, 
an extensive literature has documented that plaintiffs generally win far 
fewer than 50 percent of cases at the trial court or appellate level. This 
article investigates whether a "multimodal" approach to the selection of 
cases for litigation can reconcile the validity of the selection hypothesis 
in general with observed plaintiff win rates of less than 50 percent. The 
also stressed in William Baxter, The Political Economy of Antitrust: Principal Paper, in 
The Political Economy of Antitrust 16 (Robert D. Tollison ed. 1980) (a paper that also 
contains an intuitive version of the 50 percent hypothesis); and Patricia Munch Danzon & 
Lee A. Lillard, Settlement out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims, 
12 J. Legal Stud. 345, 352 (1983). 
2 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (4th ed. 1992); A. Mitchell Polinsky, 
An Introduction to Law and Economics (2d ed. 1989); Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law 
and Economics (1988). 
3 See Avery Katz, Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really 
Cheaper? 3 J. L., Econ. & Org. 143 (1987) (using the Priest-Klein assumption of 50 percent 
plaintiff win rate to calculate a reasonable measure of total expenditures on litigation to 
total stakes). 
4 John J. Donohue III, Law and Economics: The Road Not Taken, 22 L. & Soc. Rev. 
903 (1988). 
5 But see Donald Wittman, Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases 
for Trial: A Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. Legal Stud. 313 
(1988) (the 50 percent rule is based on the assumption that it is more difficult for litigants 
to estimate the probability of winning when the probability is close to .5 than when it is 
near the endpoints); and, for experimental evidence supporting this hypothesis, see Linda 
R. Stanley & Don L. Coursey, Empirical Evidence on the Selection Hypothesis and the 
Decision to Litigate or Settle, 19 J. Legal Stud. 145 (1990). 
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multimodal approach hypothesizes that violations of assumptions of the 
simple divergent expectations model affect the selection of cases for liti- 
gation, thereby driving the plaintiff win rate away from 50 percent. 
Based on data from 3,529 cases decided by the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals between 1982 and 1987, our findings indicate that the multimodal 
approach explains plaintiff win rates of less than 50 percent within the 
context of a divergent expectations model. First, case characteristics as- 
sociated with violations of assumptions of the divergent expectations 
model affect plaintiff win rates in the manner that simple law-and- 
economics models would predict. Second, we find that controlling for 
multimodal characteristics brings the plaintiff win rate closer to 50 per- 
cent. In other words, among cases that conform more closely to the 
assumptions underlying the Priest-Klein model, the plaintiff win rate is 
closer to 50 percent. Also, the data show that the multimodal approach 
applies in a similar fashion at each stage of the appeals process, further 
supporting its applicability. 
The first part of this article gives a brief review of the mechanics of the 
theoretical model behind the Priest-Klein paper and the simple version of 
the 50 percent rule, coupled with a cataloging of findings in the previous 
empirical literature. The second part of this article suggests how a 
multimodal approach can reconcile the selection hypothesis with ob- 
served plaintiff win rates by explaining how assumptions implicit in the 
divergent expectations model may be violated in actual cases. The third 
section outlines the appellate data that we use. The fourth section pre- 
sents our econometric model and empirical results. The fifth section pre- 
sents our conclusion that a multimodal approach to explaining the selec- 
tion of cases for litigation can improve the fit between the theory and the 
data. 
I. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
A. Theoretical Results 
The Priest-Klein hypothesis is based on a divergent expectations model 
of the selection of cases for litigation.6 In this model, cases have a true 
"quality" level Y' such that all cases with Y' greater than some "decision 
standard" D would be decided for the plaintiff if they were tried to a 
6 The following summary draws heavily on the excellent summaries found in Peter 
Siegelman & John Donohue, The Selection of Employment Discrimination Disputes for 
Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest/Klein Hypothesis, 24 J. Legal 
Stud. 427 (1995); and Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship be- 
tween Trial and Plaintiff Victory, 103 J. Pol. Econ. 229 (1995). 
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verdict, and all cases with Y' < D would be decided for the defendant. 
Plaintiffs and defendants form unbiased estimates of case quality subject 
to error, Y, and Yd, respectively. From this, each party derives an esti- 
mated probability of plaintiff victory, P, = prob(Y, > D) and Pd 
prob(Yd > D). 
The parties to the dispute do not behave strategically. The defendant 
makes a single offer, equal to her expected savings from settlement, esti- 
mated conditionally on her information, which is PdJ + Cd - Sd, where 
J represents the amount at stake, Cd represents the plaintiff's cost of 
litigating, and Sd represents the plaintiff's cost of settling. The plaintiff 
accepts the offer if it is greater than her expected benefit from trial, P,J 
- C, + Sp, and rejects the offer otherwise. Thus, cases go to trial when 
P, - Pd > (C - S)/J, where C = C, + Cd and S = Sp + Sd. The theoretical motivation behind the 50 percent rule is as follows. If 
(C - S)/J is relatively high, say, 0.3,7 then cases that fail to settle will 
be those with P, > Pd, which will be disproportionately cases with Y' 
D-cases with the true quality close to the decision standard-because 
it is in those close cases that normal differences in estimation of quality 
across parties lead to large differences in the estimated probability of 
winning at trial. Put another way, if both parties agree that the plaintiff 
has a very small chance of winning, for example, Y' << D, then differ- 
ences in parties' assessment of case quality are unlikely to be large 
enough to prevent the parties from settling. 
B. Empirical Results 
Researchers have examined plaintiff win rates, both in the trial phase 
(including pretrial motions) and on appeal, in order to assess the 50 per- 
cent hypothesis, across a diverse group of data sets. A sample of studies 
from this large literature are summarized in Table 1 and listed in Appen- 
dix A. 
The studies in Table 1 indicate that plaintiffs generally win less than 
50 percent of their cases at all phases of the legal process.8 At the pretrial 
stage, for example, Eisenberg rejects the hypothesis that plaintiffs win 
50 percent of all motions in a sample of 204,560 cases in Federal District 
Court.9 Although plaintiff win rates of less than 50 percent may be an 
American phenomenon, deviation from the 50 percent rule is not. Ram- 
7 Contingency fee attorneys, for example, regularly charge clients fees of around 30-40 
percent of total judgment size. 
8 With some notable exceptions, such as Waldfogel, cited supra. 
9 Theodore Eisenberg, The Relationship between Plaintiff Success Rates before Trial and 
at Trial, 154 J. Royal Stat. Soc. I 11 (ser. A, pt. 1, 1991). 
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seyer and Nakazato, for example, analyze approximately 770,000 civil 
actions from Japanese courts and find that plaintiff success rates are 
significantly greater than 50 percent.'0 Furthermore, several different 
measures of plaintiff success suggest that deviation from the 50 percent 
rule persists at the appellate stage. Plaintiffs-at-trial who appeal win fewer 
than 50 percent of their cases at the appellate level. In addition, appellants 
as a class win fewer than 50 percent of their appeals, whether they were 
plaintiffs- or defendants-at-trial. 
Recent empirical work provides support for the selection hypothesis 
more generally, despite low plaintiff win rates. Siegelman and Donohue, 
for example, find that the employment discrimination cases filed during 
recessions are more likely to be settled than the employment discrimina- 
tion cases filed during booms, due to a selection effect that leads parties 
to be less likely to litigate relatively weak cases. Along these lines, Wald- 
fogel finds support for the selection hypothesis based on the fact that 
judges who are more likely to try cases to a verdict have plaintiff win 
rates that are further from 50 percent. 
II. RECONCILING THE SELECTION HYPOTHESIS WITH OBSERVED PLAINTIFF 
WIN RATES: A MULTIMODAL APPROACH 
The multimodal approach attempts to reconcile the selection hypothe- 
sis with observed plaintiff win rates by investigating whether case charac- 
teristics associated with violations of assumptions of the simple divergent 
expectations model affect the selection of cases for litigation. We con- 
sider seven characteristics of cases that law-and-economics models pre- 
dict would affect the plaintiff win rate in litigated cases within the diver- 
gent expectations framework. In this section, we discuss each of the 
seven case characteristics that we examine and how each of them would 
affect plaintiff win rates within the divergent expectations framework. 
Differential Stakes. As Priest and Klein observe, the hypothesis as- 
sumes that the stakes of the parties in the litigation are the same-that 
is, that the defendant stands to lose as much as the plaintiff stands to 
gain, no more or less." When the stakes of the parties differ, Priest and 
Klein argue that the party with the greater stakes is likely to have a higher 
degree of success in the litigation. The intuitive reason is that the party 
0 J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts 
and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. Legal Stud. 263 (1989). 
" Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 24-29, 40. See also Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation 
Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 Geo. L. J. 1567, 1594-95 
(1989); Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework 
with Empirical Tests, 19 J. Legal Stud. 337, 338-39 (1990). 
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF THE PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
Study Data Set No. of Observations Success Rates 
Clermont and Eisenberg Federal trials where parties had 37,503 jury trials; 53,635 trials Analysis of subject matter catego- 
(1992) right to jury trial ries rejects 50 percent 
hypothesis. 
Only 22 of 93 categories of bench 
trial cases show plaintiff suc- 
cess rates of between 45 and 
55 percent. 
Only 16 of 93 categories of jury 
trial cases show plaintiff suc- 
cess rates of between 45 and 
55 percent. 
Danzon and Lillard (1983) Medical malpractice insurance 385 trials Plaintiff success rate: 26.8 
case files closed in two years percent 
Eisenberg (1989) Federal district court trials 57,206 trials Only 16 of 72 subject matter cate- 
between 1978-85 gories show plaintiff success 
rates of between 45 and 55 
percent. 
Eisenberg (1990) Tort trials in three Cook County, 14,671 trials 50 percent hypothesis cannot be 
Illinois, courts, 1959-79 rejected, but data are 
inconclusive. 
Test across districts rejects 50 
percent hypothesis. 
Nonbankruptcy civil cases in fed- 57,206 trials Analysis of subject matter catego- 
eral district courts, 1978-85 ries rejects 50 percent hypothe- 
sis; only 16 of 72 subject mat- 
ter areas show plaintiff success 
rates between 45 and 55 
percent. 
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Eisenberg (1991) Nonbankruptcy civil cases in fed- 204,560 cases resolved by pretrial Analysis of subject matter catego- 
eral district courts, 1978-85 motion ries rejects 50 percent hypothe- 
sis; only 10 of 72 subject mat- 
ter areas show plaintiff success 
rates between 45 and 55 
percent. 
Eisenberg and Johnson Federal court opinions in civil 146 appellate opinions and 176 Success rates as follows: plain- 
(1991) rights and employment cases, district court opinions tiffs at trial: 40 percent; plain- 
1976-88 tiff-appellants: 27 percent; de- 
fendant-appellants: 26 percent 
Eisenberg and Henderson Published appellate opinions in 1,100 opinions Success rates as follows: plain- 
(1993) products liability cases tiff-appellants: 37.4 percent; 
defendant-appellants: 34.3 
percent 
Eisenberg and Schwab Constitutional tort cases in three 771 opinions Success rates as follows: 
(1989) federal circuits resulting in Nonprisoner cases: plaintiff- 
opinions published between appellants: 38 percent; defen- 
October 1, 1980, and Decem- dant-appellants: 48 percent 
ber 31, 1985 Prisoner case: plaintiff- 
appellants: 48 percent; defen- 
dant-appellants: 69 percent 
Control group (not constitutional 
tort cases): plaintiff-appellants: 
35 percent; defendant- 
appellants: 33 percent 
Gross and Syverud (1991) Civil jury trials in California state 529 trials Plaintiff success rate: 51.4 per- 
superior courts, 1985-86 cent 
Eisenberg and Henderson State and federal district court fil- 2,882 state court opinions; 9,636 Plaintiff success rates as follows: 
(1990) ings in product liability cases, federal district court cases State and federal courts com- 
Henderson and Eisenberg 1979-89 bined: in 1979: 56 percent; in 
(1992) 1989: 39 percent 
Federal district courts: in 1979: 
41 percent; in 1989: 31 percent 
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TABLE 1 (Continued) 
tO 
Study Data Set No. of Observations Success Rates 
Priest and Klein (1984) Tort trials in three Cook County, 14,671 trials Plaintiff success rates as follows: 
Illinois, courts, 1959-79 municipal courts: 45.6 percent; 
circuit courts: 49.5 percent; 
U.S. district court: 53.0 
percent 
Overall: 48.5 percent 
Ramseyer and Nakazato Contested ordinary civil actions Approximately 530,000 district Plaintiff success rates as follows: 
(1989) in Japanese courts court cases and 240,000 sum- district court: 78 percent; sum- 
mary court cases mary court: 81.9 percent 
Schnapper (1989) Published federal appellate deci- 208 decisions Appellant success rates as fol- 
sions in which a party chal- lows: commercial cases: 27.4 
lenged sufficiency of evidence percent; constitutional cases: 
to support a jury verdict 41.1 percent; personal injury 
cases: 30.6 percent; discrimina- 
tion cases: 52.9 percent 
Plaintiff-appellants: 7.7 percent to 
38.5 percent depending on 
case; Defendant-appellants: 
40.0 percent to 58.5 percent de- 
pending on case 
Schultz and Patterson Race and sex discrimination 63 district court cases (race); 54 Success rates as follows: 
(1992) cases in which lack of interest district court cases (sex); 32 ap- Plaintiffs at trial: 49.2 percent 
defense was in issue peals (race); 19 appeals (sex) (race); 46.3 percent (sex) 
Plaintiff-appellants: 50 percent 
(race); 40 percent (sex) 
Defendant-appellants: 75 percent 
(race); 57.1 percent (sex) 
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Eisenberg and Schwab Nonprisoner constitutional tort 1,837 cases Plaintiff success rate: 27 percent 
(1987) cases filed in 1 year in three 
Schwab and Eisenberg districts 
(1988) 
Siegelman and Donohue Employment discrimination law- 221,118 filings Plaintiff success rate: between 
(1994) suits filed in federal district 16.4 percent and 20.9 percent, 
courts, 1969-89 depending on unemployment 
rate 
Waldfogel (1995) Federal civil cases from the 25,940 cases Plaintiff success rate: 50 percent 
Southern District of New 
York, filed 1984-87 and termi- 
nated by the end of 1989 
Wheeler, Cartright, Supreme court decisions in 16 5,343 decisions Appellant success rate: 40 
Kagan, and Friedman states, 1870-1970 percent 
(1987) 
Wittman (1985) Rear-end accident jury trials in 582 trials Plaintiff success rates as follows: 
California 83 percent under contributory 
negligence regime; 84 percent 
under comparative negligence 
Note (1978) Supreme court decisions in 16 5,113 decisions Appellant success rate: 39 
states, 1870-1970 percent 
By state, range from 28.8 percent 
to 58.1 percent. 
By case type, range from 35.3 
percent to 41.6 percent. 
SoURCE.-See Appendix A. 
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with larger stakes has more to lose from the litigation and therefore is 
likely to offer enough to settle the case, from the perspective of the party 
with a lesser stake, in order to avoid a larger loss at trial.12 Thus the 
cases that are selected for trial are likely to be ones in which the party 
with the greater stakes has a relatively better chance for success than 
would be the case when the stakes are equal. 
Among litigated cases in which the defendant has higher stakes than 
the plaintiff, then, we would expect the plaintiff win rate to be less than 
50 percent. In an employment discrimination case, for example, the fact 
that an adverse judgment at trial harms the employer/defendant (in terms 
of reputation, or in terms of the influence of an adverse judgment on 
other pending or not-yet-filed claims) more than it benefits the employee/ 
plaintiff means that the plaintiff win rate in employment discrimination 
cases, all else equal, should be less than 50 percent. 
A number of studies have analyzed deviations from the 50 percent 
baseline as the possible consequence of differential party stakes. Priest 
and Klein's disaggregated data showed that product liability and medical 
malpractice cases displayed plaintiff success rates significantly below the 
predicted 50 percent." Priest and Klein hypothesize that manufacturers 
had greater stakes than persons harmed in products liability cases be- 
cause of the danger of an unfavorable judicial precedent, and doctors 
had more at stake than patients because of the potential harm to their 
reputations from an unfavorable verdict.14 Results obtained by Danzon 
and Lillard are consistent.'5 
Differential Sophistication of the Parties. Differential sophistication of 
the parties also affects the plaintiff win rate.'6 In the context of a criminal 
case where the defendant has private information about his chances at trial, 
for instance, Froeb shows that defendants with relatively good chances at 
trial are more likely to go to trial.'7 This outcome, he points out, is analo- 
gous to adverse selection in an insurance market. Just as relatively worse 
risks are more likely to purchase insurance, so are defendants with rela- 
tively worse chances at trial more likely to settle their cases. Thus, superior 
defendant information in criminal cases implies that the government's win 
rate among tried cases should be lower than 50 percent. 
12 See Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 26. 
'3 Id. at 38. 
14 Id. at 39-41. 
15 Danzon & Lillard, supra note 1. 
16 See, for example, Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of 
Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. Legal Stud. 187 (1993). 
17 Luke Froeb, The Adverse Selection of Cases for Trial, 13 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 317 
(1993). 
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A simple example illustrates this point in the context of the civil justice 
system. Assume that there is a sample of lawsuits, half of which are good 
suits that will generate a judgment for the plaintiff of $100 if brought to 
trial, and half of which are bad lawsuits that will generate a judgment for 
the defendant-at-trial. Defendants are highly sophisticated, so that the 
defendant always knows which of the two categories-good or bad-a 
particular case falls into. Plaintiffs, in contrast, are unsophisticated and 
are unable to sort cases accurately into good or bad cases. Plaintiffs 
randomly assign values of $0 or $100 to cases without regard to their 
likelihood of success at trial. This yields four possible states, each with 
equal probability: 
Defendants Plaintiffs 
A. $100 $100 
B. $100 $0 
C. $0 $100 
D. $0 $0 
At pretrial settlement negotiations, both plaintiffs and defendants al- 
ways demand or offer what they think the case is worth: $100 if they 
believe the case is good, and nothing if they believe the case is bad. 
Cases falling into categories A and B will settle for $100-the defendant's 
offer of $100 either equals or exceeds the plaintiff's demand of $100 or 
$0. Cases falling into category D settle for $0-the parties agree to a 
dismissal. Only cases that fall into category C do not settle since the 
plaintiff demands $100 and the defendant offers nothing. But such cases 
are always losers for plaintiffs since we have assumed that the sophisti- 
cated defendant only offers nothing if the case is worth nothing. 
In this example, defendants would win 100 percent of the time in cases 
that progressed to trial. More generally, the selection effect of party so- 
phistication means that the sophisticated party will win a higher percent- 
age of the cases selected for trial than will unsophisticated parties. The 
empirical evidence provides at least weak support for this hypothesis; 
parties who might be considered unsophisticated, such as prisoners and 
civil rights plaintiffs, have an abnormally low success rate. 
Mismeasurement of Plaintiff Victory, or Damages versus Liability. In 
several types of civil cases, parties frequently litigate damages, with lia- 
bility conceded (for example, rear-end accident litigation). In the studies 
discussed in Table 1, the standard for plaintiff "success" is typically 
whether the plaintiff received any benefit at trial or appeal.'" By this 
18 See, for example, Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: 
Transcending Empiricism, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1124, 1133-34 (1992) (authors consider a case 
a success or win if the plaintiff gets any judgment). 
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standard, though, plaintiffs will appear to succeed far more often than 
they actually do in those cases in which the dispute is essentially over 
damages, which means that the 50 percent rule may not hold as an artifact 
of case accounting.19 
Again, the point can be illustrated with a simple numerical example. 
Assume that the plaintiff and the defendant agree that the defendant will 
have to pay the plaintiff something, but cannot agree on how much. The 
plaintiff demands $100, and the defendant is not willing to offer more 
than $50. Assume that half of the time the plaintiff accurately predicts 
the trial outcome-the plaintiff will receive $100 at trial-and the other 
half of the time the defendant correctly predicts that the plaintiff will 
receive $50. The observed trial outcomes will be that the plaintiff gets 
$50 half of the time and $100 half of the time. According to the metric 
used in the standard empirical studies, this would represent a 100 percent 
plaintiff success rate. But on the issue of damages-which is the only 
real issue in the case-the actual success rate for plaintiffs would be only 
50 percent: only half of the time do plaintiffs receive at trial what they 
demanded from defendants in settlement negotiations, while the rest of 
the time defendants win the victory because they are forced to pay no 
more than they would have been willing to pay in settlement. 
The theory that high levels of plaintiff success can be explained by the 
incidence of suits where damages rather than liability is in dispute is 
developed by Ramseyer and Nakazato to support the observed high rates 
of plaintiff victors in their data set.20 It also appears likely that a damages 
effect explains the high level of plaintiff victories (approximately 83 per- 
cent) observed by Wittman in his study of rear-end accident litigation in 
California;21 because most rear-end accidents appear to present an obvi- 
ous case for liability, the litigation in these cases was almost certainly 
focused on disputes over the amount of damages. 
Legal Standard Favors One Side. If the legal standard that is applied 
at trial favors one side over the other, then the strict version of the 50 
percent rule may not hold under a wide range of circumstances. Indeed, 
Priest and Klein recognize that the divergent expectations model only 
predicts that the plaintiff win rate among litigated cases will tend toward 
50 percent, not be equal to 50 percent. Put another way, the 50 percent 
rule implies that a change in the decision standard that would decrease 
~9 Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 29; Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 338-39; Ramseyer & 
Nakazato, supra note 10, at 284. 
20 Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 10, at 263. 
21 Donald Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased? 14 J. Legal Stud. 185 
(1985). 
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the probability of plaintiff victory by x percent, if all disputes were liti- 
gated, would decrease the probability of plaintiff victory among actually 
litigated disputes by less than x percent. 
This result might arise in two plausible situations. First, if parties' error 
in assessing the probability of plaintiff victory is normally distributed, 
then the share of winning plaintiffs in the pool of litigated cases will fall 
as the decision standard leans more toward the defendant because the 
probability distribution of errors around the decision standard will be- 
come progressively asymmetric.22 Second, if a small number of cases are 
litigated at random because (for example) a small number of disputes 
have at least one irrational litigant, then the probability of plaintiff victory 
in the pool of litigated cases will be a weighted average of the probability 
of plaintiff victory in all disputes and 50 percent. As the probability of 
plaintiff victory in all disputes decreases, so then would the probability 
of plaintiff victory in litigated disputes, albeit at a slower rate. 
Settlement Costs High Relative to Litigation Costs. As settlement 
costs rise relative to litigation costs, the number of litigated disputes 
increases. Consider the extreme case, in the model of divergent expecta- 
tions presented above, where there were no savings from settlement: in 
other words, C = S. In this case, the parties settle only if P, = Pd, and 
virtually all cases are litigated. Therefore the probability of a plaintiff 
victory in a litigated dispute tends toward the probability of plaintiff vic- 
tory in the population as a whole. If other factors lead the probability of 
plaintiff victory in the population of all cases to be less than 50 percent, 
then cases with high settlement costs will exhibit a plaintiff win rate of 
less than half. 
Even if this sort of example is unrealistic in the context of trial, it may 
be realistic at the appellate stage. Assume, for example, that a case has 
generated a verdict for the defendant-at-trial. Both risk-neutral parties 
know that the plaintiff's probability of success on appeal is 5 percent. The 
plaintiff's litigation costs for the appeal are $3,000, and the defendant's 
litigation costs for appeal are also $3,000. The transactions costs of nego- 
tiating a settlement on appeal are $5,000 for each party. The reason that 
the transactions costs of settling exceed the litigation costs is that the 
appeal involves a simple question of law that the parties have already 
fully briefed and argued during trial motions. In these conditions settle- 
ment will not occur because the parties would spend more negotiating a 
settlement than they would in prosecuting and defending the appeal. The 
appeal will go forward, generating affirmances in 95 percent of the cases. 
22 See Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 20-24, for an explanation and proof. 
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This effect may partly explain the observation, in numerous studies of 
appellate outcomes, that appellants typically succeed far less than 50 
percent of the time. Appellants face a difficult burden on appeal because 
they must convince the appeals court either that the trier of fact erred or 
that the judge misconstrued the applicable law. One would expect, there- 
fore, that most of the cases selected for appeal because the settlement 
costs exceed the litigation costs will end up as affirmances, a prediction 
consistent with the empirical evidence. 
High Awards. Throughout the divergent expectations model, parties 
to a dispute are assumed to be risk-neutral; in other words, they are only 
concerned with the expected value of a case, not with the variance of 
possible outcomes around the expected value. 
Of course, this assumption is an imperfect approximation of reality. 
Litigants, particularly plaintiffs as a class, would be risk-averse over the 
range of possible outcomes of a case if the expected value of the case 
amounted to a substantial fraction of the litigant's total wealth. 
Risk aversion, then, tends to increase the gains to settlement, thereby 
causing fewer disputes to be litigated. If the probability of a plaintiff 
victory in the population is less than 50 percent, cases with high awards 
will follow the 50 percent rule more closely than cases with lower awards. 
Agency Effects. Law suits are ostensibly brought in the name of par- 
ties, but the parties are typically represented by attorneys who have their 
own interests to serve in the litigation. This problem is particularly acute 
in the case of settlement.23 Attorneys who work on an hourly fee basis 
have an incentive to defer settlement and to continue working on the 
case as long as their return per hour of work on the case exceeds their 
opportunity cost of time. Thus, hourly fee attorneys may sometimes rec- 
ommend against settlement early in the litigation even when settlement 
would be in the client's best interest. Contingency fee lawyers present a 
converse problem: the contingency fee lawyer has an incentive to settle 
a case very early in the litigation, even for an amount much lower than 
the client would receive after trial, because the attorney bears all the 
litigation expenses and can earn a high hourly fee by an early settlement. 
These incentive effects, which are well known, suggest that cases in 
which the plaintiff is represented by an attorney on an hourly fee basis 
will have a lower success rate at trial than cases where the attorney is 
working on a contingent fee, if the probability of plaintiff victory in the 
population of all cases is less than 50 percent, because the hourly fee 
23 This discussion follows Geoffrey Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 26 J. 
Legal Stud. 189 (1987). 
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lawyer has a greater incentive to defer settlement and thus move the case 
toward trial. 
The incentive of hourly fee attorneys to litigate, however, may be miti- 
gated by reputation effects. While the hourly fee attorney has an incentive 
to delay settlement up to a point close to trial, once trial is in the offing 
the hourly fee lawyer's incentives are more ambiguous. Trial may be 
risky for the hourly fee attorney because the attorney risks losing the 
case. A loss, and especially a repeated series of losses, can have an 
adverse effect on the attorney's reputation because clients and other law- 
yers may conclude that the loss was due either to the attorney's bad trial 
skills or to his or her bad advice to the client. The client is also likely to 
blame the attorney for the loss, especially if the attorney has previously 
assured the client that the prospects for success in the litigation are good. 
Thus, as trial approaches, the hourly fee attorney has much more to lose 
from not settling than he or she does early in the litigation. One might 
infer that hourly fee attorneys are likely to try hard to settle cases as trial 
approaches and that the cases that do not settle will often be those for 
which the attorney could not get a realistic settlement offer-cases where 
the probability of success is relatively good. 
The result that hourly fee attorneys litigate more than contingency fee 
attorneys may also be mitigated by the fact that contingency fee attorneys 
have reputation effects that encourage them to litigate, ceteris paribus. 
Far from dreading a loss at trial, a contingency fee attorney might see it 
as offering reputational advantages. By taking a case to trial, even if the 
case is unsuccessful, the contingency fee attorney demonstrates that he 
or she is able to go to trial with a weak case. This makes the attorney's 
threats of trial more credible in settlement negotiations. Further, it is 
unlikely that an unsuccessful case will harm the attorney's reputation 
with potential clients. Most contingency fee clients are going to be one- 
shot players who do not have good information about the quality of their 
attorney. Even if the client had access to the lawyer's track record, a 
history of some trial losses would not necessarily be grounds for alarm 
since the client could rationally conclude that the trial losses increase the 
attorney's ability to threaten trial in settlement negotiations and since the 
costs of trial are typically going to be borne in any event by the attorney 
and not the client. 
But if the client controls the decision to litigate, then agency effects 
can have the opposite effect. Because the client bears less than the true 
cost of litigation under a contingency fee contract, and at least the true 
cost of litigation under an hourly fee contract, contingency fee plaintiffs 
would be more likely to litigate than hourly fee plaintiffs. Alternatively, 
Gross and Syverud point out that, if plaintiffs as a class are more liquid- 
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TABLE 2 
PREDICTED EFFECTS OF MULTIMODAL CHARACTERISTICS ON PLAINTIFF WIN RATES AT TRIAL 
Effect on Plaintiff 
Multimodal Characteristics Win Rate at Trial 
Defendant's stakes higher than plaintiff's (hi-d-stakes) 
Defendant's information superior to plaintiff's (hi-d-info) 
Mismeasurement of plaintiff victory (mismeasure) + 
Legal standard favors defendant (law-favors-d) 
Settlement costs high relative to litigation costs (hi-set-cost) 
High awards (hi-award) + 
Agency effects (agency) +, -, or 0 
NOTE.-A positive sign indicates an increase in win rate, a negative sign indicates a decrease in win 
rate, and a zero indicates no change. 
ity-constrained than attorneys, then they will be less willing to go to trial 
when paying the attorney on an hourly basis than when the attorney 
represents the plaintiff on a contingency fee.24 
Thus, the effect of the agency effects associated with different fee 
arrangements on the selection of cases for litigation is theoretically inde- 
terminate, and it depends on the relative control that the attorney and 
client have over the decision to litigate. By implication, the effect of 
contingency fee contracts versus hourly fee contracts on the probability 
of plaintiff victory at trial is also indeterminate. Assuming that the proba- 
bility of plaintiff victory in the population at large is less than 50 percent, 
if clients control the decision to litigate, then contingency fee contracts 
should be associated with a lower probability of plaintiff victory; if attor- 
neys control the decision to litigate, then contingency fee contracts 
should be associated with a higher probability of plaintiff victory. 
The predicted effect of each of the seven multimodal characteristics 
discussed above on the probability of plaintiff victory is summarized in 
Table 2, assuming that the probability of plaintiff victory in the population 
of claims at large is less than 50 percent. For the differential stakes cate- 
gory, as with the differential sophistication and legal standard favors one 
side categories, we report the predicted effect of the defendant having 
the characteristic; an analogous prediction could be made for the plaintiff. 
III. DATA 
We analyze 3,529 civil cases decided on the merits by the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals between 1982 and 1987. We began with data 
24 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotia- 
tions and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 319 (1991). 
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maintained by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts on 
all Seventh Circuit terminations of noncriminal matters from July 1982 
through June 1987-some 10,072 terminations, 8,424 of which were civil. 
These records contain information on the nature of the case. Civil cases 
are first categorized as being either "private" or "federal" cases. The 
"private civil" category is divided into 105 subcategories in ten broad 
areas, which are used by the district courts in their initial classification 
of the cases.25 The records also include the date of docketing, the date 
of disposition, and the nature of the disposition.26 
The Administrative Office also provided us with a computerized data- 
base consisting of some 15,397 civil and criminal appeals that had been 
docketed in the Seventh Circuit from 1980 through 1989. These records 
indicate the names of the first named plaintiff and the first named defen- 
dant in the district court. In the civil appeals, we attempted to match the 
plaintiffs' names in this general database with the names of appellees or 
appellants in the termination database. Of these, we found 3,529 civil 
cases decided on the merits for which we were able to identify the appel- 
lant as either plaintiff or defendant. 
Table 3 presents the outcomes of trials, at each stage of the process, 
by subcategory of litigation. The data suggest that the simple version of 
the 50 percent rule does not hold. The last row of the third column of 
Table 3 shows that the fraction of plaintiffs-at-trial who won after appeals 
had been decided was 31.4 percent. Consistent with this, the overwhelm- 
ing majority of suit types show a plaintiff win rate of less than 50 percent. 
25 The 10 broad categories are "contract," "real property," "torts/personal injury," 
"torts/personal property damage," "civil rights," "prisoner petitions," "forfeiture and 
penalty," "labor laws," "property rights," and "social security," as well as other federal 
statutes. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Statistical Codes for Appeals 
Reports Submitted by the Clerks of Court, United States Court of Appeals 4, Exhibit A, 
at A-1. These categories are further broken into 105 subcategories: for example, "civil 
rights" is broken into "voting," "jobs accommodation," "welfare," and other civil rights. 
Id. 
26 The computer tapes describe terminations as either on the merits or procedural. Merit 
terminations are divided into terminations that were made after oral hearing and termina- 
tions that were made on submissions without hearing. These terminations are further divided 
by outcome, that is, affirmed/enforced, reversed/vacated, affirmed in part/reversed in part, 
dismissed, remanded, transferred, and other. Procedural terminations are divided into ter- 
minations made with and without other judicial action. Appeals terminated with judicial 
action are classified by the grounds for disposition, for example, jurisdictional, voluntary 
dismissals, default, transfers, denial of certificate of probable cause in habeas appeals, and 
other. Appeals terminated without judicial action are broken into voluntary dismissals, 
default, and other. In addition, the computer tapes record the form of the disposition: 
published or unpublished, signed or unsigned, with or without comment. While the Adminis- 
trative Office maintains information on the panel members involved in each termination, 
the office deleted this information from the computer tapes. 
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TABLE 3 
TRIAL OUTCOMES BY TYPE OF SUIT 
prob 
(Plaintiff prob 
Win in (Plaintiff prob 
Trial Win after (Appellant 
Suit Court) Appeals) Win) N 
Code Description (1) (2) (3) (4) 
110 Insurance-contract .420 .469 .296 81 
150 Enforcement of judgments- .000 .333 .333 3 
contract 
151 Recovery of overpayments, .750 .500 .250 4 
Medicare-contract 
152 Recovery of defaulted student 1.000 1.000 .000 1 
loans-contract 
160 Stockholders' suits-contract .333 .667 .333 3 
190 Other contract actions .452 .455 .304 418 
195 Contract product liability .429 .571 .143 7 
210 Land condemnation-real .500 .500 .000 2 
property 
220 Foreclosure-real property .870 .783 .087 23 
230 Rent/lease/ejectment-real .500 .333 .833 6 
property 
240 Torts to land-real property .400 .400 .000 5 
245 Tort-product liability-real .000 .000 .000 1 
property 
290 Other real property actions .471 .353 .235 17 
310 Airplane-torts, personal injury .200 .400 .200 5 
315 Airplane products liability- 1.000 .000 1.000 2 
torts, personal injury 
320 Assault/libel/slander-torts, .258 .290 .226 31 
personal injury 
330 Federal employer liability- .333 .333 .000 6 
torts, personal injury 
340 Marine-torts, personal injury .300 .300 .000 10 
350 Motor vehicle-torts, personal .171 .286 .171 35 
injury 
355 Motor vehicle products liabil- .400 .600 .200 5 
ity-torts, personal injury 
360 Other personal injury .268 .268 .247 97 
362 Personal injury-medical .000 .500 .500 6 
malpractice 
365 Personal injury-products .410 .361 .337 83 
liability 
370 Other fraud-torts, personal .344 .375 .219 32 
property damage 
371 Truth in lending-torts, per- .000 .000 .000 1 
sonal property damage 
380 Other personal property damage .320 .320 .240 25 
385 Property damage-product .250 .250 .000 4 
liability 
410 Antitrust .359 .272 .304 92 
420 Bankruptcy trustee .000 .000 .000 1 
421 Bankruptcy transfer rule 1.000 1.000 .000 1 
430 Banks and banking .214 .214 .286 14 
250 
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
prob 
(Plaintiff prob 
Win in (Plaintiff prob 
Trial Win after (Appellant 
Suit Court) Appeals) Win) N 
Code Description (1) (2) (3) (4) 
440 Civil rights .228 .269 .286 685 
441 Voting-civil rights .154 .615 .615 26 
442 Jobs-civil rights .152 .243 .261 448 
443 Accommodations-civil rights .438 .438 .375 16 
444 Welfare-civil rights .368 .368 .211 19 
450 Interstate commerce .308 .462 .308 13 
540 Mandamus/other-prisoner .207 .310 .103 29 
petitions 
550 Prisoner-civil rights .079 .146 .168 458 
610 Agriculture acts-forfeiture and .500 .500 .000 2 
penalty 
620 Food and drug acts-forfeiture .714 1.000 .286 7 
and penalty 
640 Railroad and trucks-forfeiture .000 .000 .000 2 
and penalty 
690 Other forfeiture and penalty .625 .750 .375 8 
710 Fair Labor Standards Act .231 .385 .615 13 
720 Labor/Management Relations .318 .279 .209 129 
Act 
730 Labor/Management Reporting/ .158 .421 .263 19 
Disclosure Act 
740 Railway Labor Act .238 .238 .190 21 
790 Other labor litigation .246 .351 .316 57 
791 Employee Retirement Income .286 .408 .408 49 
Security Act 
820 Copyright-property rights .714 .571 .429 21 
830 Patent-property rights .533 .367 .300 30 
840 Trademark-property rights .431 .588 .314 51 
850 Securities, commodities, .367 .458 .392 120 
exchange 
860 Social Security before 7/78 .130 .261 .217 23 
861 Social Security, 42 USC 923 .556 .111 .444 9 
863 Social Security, 42 USC 405(g) .013 .338 .351 77 
864 Social Security, Supplemental .179 .357 .250 28 
Security Income 
865 Social Security, Surviving Child .333 .333 .000 3 
870 Tax litigation benefits .272 .259 .210 81 
871 IRS/third-party suits .500 .375 .125 8 
875 Customer challenges .000 .500 .500 2 
891 Agricultural acts .000 .000 .000 2 
893 Environmental litigation .357 .286 .500 14 
895 Freedom of Information Act .250 .250 .500 8 
950 Constitutionality of state .643 .214 .571 28 
statutues 
970 National Archives and Records 1.000 1.000 .000 1 
Administration 
990 Other local questions .000 .000 .000 1 
Total .269 .314 .273 3,529 
251 
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TABLE 4 
CLASSIFICATION OF CASE TYPES INTO MULTIMODAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Share of 
Observations 
Multimodal with This 
Characteristic Suit Codes Included Characteristic 
hi-d-stakes 110, 220, 190, 310-370, 380, 410, 442, 540, .660 
550, 710-840, 870 
hi-d-info 110, 190, 310-370, 380, 540, 550, 791, 863 .403 
mismeasure 310-385 .097 
law-favors-d 220, 440-444, 550, 863 .497 
hi-set-cost 190, 370, 380, 540, 550, 820-840, 863, 870 .339 
hi-award 110, 190, 310-340, 355, 362, 365, 371, 410, .265 
820-850 
agency 110, 310-365, 410, 440-444, 540, 550, 791-850, .703 
863 
NOTE.-See Table 2 for definitions of multimodal characteristics. 
Six of 70 categories (8.6 percent), representing 16 cases (0.5 percent of 
all cases), have a plaintiff win rate of exactly 50 percent; 13 of 70 catego- 
ries (18.6 percent), representing 175 cases (5.0 percent), have a plaintiff 
win rate of more than 50 percent. However, 51 of 70 categories (72.9 
percent), representing 3,338 cases (94.5 percent), have a plaintiff win rate 
of less than 50 percent. 
Table 3 also shows that appellants, taken together, win fewer than half 
of their cases, and, with the exception of appellants in certain civil rights 
cases, appellants win less frequently than do plaintiffs-at-trial. Overall, 
27.3 percent of appellants won their appeals, compared to 26.9 percent 
of plaintiffs-at-trial. But this does not make clear that, in 50 of 70 catego- 
ries (71.4 percent), appellants are less likely to win than plaintiffs-at-trial. 
Put another way, excluding categories 440-442 (civil rights, voting-civil 
rights, and jobs-civil rights cases), plaintiffs won 30.4 percent of cases 
at trial, but appellants won only 26.8 percent of cases. It appears that 
the simple version of the 50 percent rule holds neither at trial nor on 
appeal. 
Table 4 shows how we consolidated the 70 suit types into the seven 
multimodal categories. To review the 70 suit codes reported in the data- 
base to determine which of the seven characteristics discussed above 
each had, we collapse closely related suit codes into common groups.27 
27 For example, the Administrative Office's 10 subcategories of personal injury litigation 
(codes 310-365) were treated as a single group, thus allowing us to include suit codes with 
only one or two cases on the database. 
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We then omit categories that have less than 20 cases that could not be 
grouped to avoid statistical problems. Although several categories have 
cases that are civil in form, we omit them from the study because they 
are not civil in substance. Thus, both state habeas and federal section 
2255 attack substantive aspects of criminal proceedings and were omit- 
ted. Finally, we examine data on filings in several catch-all categories, 
such as "miscellaneous contract" or "other statutory" and either find 
we are able to categorize them or conclude that the cases in the category 
are too varied to be characterized. 
IV. THE MODEL AND RESULTS 
We model the plaintiff's (discrete) success in case i, Yi, as a function 
of a continuous, unobserved underlying index of plaintiff success, y,*.28 
Define a plaintiff win in case i with Yi = 1, where Yi = 1 if and only if 
Y* > 0. Also, define the underlying index of plaintiff success in case i as 
a linear function of the vector of multimodal characteristics of case i, Xi, 
a parameter vector of the effect of characteristics on the index and a 
constant term, 0, and an independently and identically normally distrib- 
uted error term for case i, Ei, var(Ei) = 1, that is uncorrelated with any 
of the multimodal characteristics: 
Y* = Xji + Ei (1) 
In this model, then, the probability of plaintiff victory in case i can be 
written 
prob(Yi = 1) = prob(Y* > 0) = D(Xip), (2) 
where Q(*) is the cumulative normal distribution function. Maximum- 
likelihood estimation of this "probit" model chooses P to maximize the 
likelihood of observing the sample, thereby providing estimates of the 
effect of each multimodal characteristic on the probability of plaintiff 
victory, holding the other characteristics of a case constant.29 
We estimated the probit model above defining plaintiff success in terms 
of plaintiff success at trial, plaintiff success in the litigation process as a 
whole, and appellant success. Because the raw probit results cannot be 
easily interpreted in terms of probabilities,30 we calculated the effect of 
each multimodal characteristic on the probability of plaintiff victory as 
28 The variables Yi and Y,* can be defined in terms of plaintiff success at trial, plaintiff 
success in the litigation process as a whole, or appellant success. 
29 See, for example, William Greene, Econometric Analysis, sec. 20.3 (1st ed. 1990). 30 Id. 
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TABLE 5 
IMPACT OF MULTIMODAL CHARACTERISTICS ON THE PROBABILITY OF 
PLAINTIFF VICTORY, CALCULATED FOR THE SAMPLE AVERAGE CASE 
(Standard Errors Are in Parentheses) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Plaintiff 
MULTIMODAL Plaintiff Win after Appellant 
CHARACTERISTIC Win at Trial Appeals Win 
hi-d-stakes - .038* - .061** - .062** 
(.020) (.020) (.020) 
hi-d-info - .073** - .012 .000 
(.025) (.027) (.026) 
mismeasure .060* - .010 - .041 
(.037) (.036) (.034) 
law-favors-d - .046 - .047 - .028 
(.029) (.031) (.030) 
hi-set-cost - .042* - .031 - .038 
(.024) (.026) (.026) 
hi-award .200** .138** .076** 
(.027) (.027) (.026) 
agency -. 137** - .067* .006 
(.027) (.027) (.026) 
NOTE.-Calculations are based on probit estimates, which are found in 
Appendix Table B1. See Table 2 for definitions of multimodal characteristics. 
* Significant at the 90 percent level. 
** Significant at the 95 percent level. 
the difference between the probability of plaintiff success for a case that 
had a particular multimodal characteristic and the probability of plaintiff 
success for a case that did not, assuming all of the other characteristics 
of the case were equal to the average characteristics in the sample." 
Table 5 presents these probabilities and their standard errors; the raw 
probit estimates are presented in Appendix B. 
The first column of Table 5 provides estimates of the effect of each of 
the multimodal characteristics on the probability of a plaintiff win at trial. 
The estimated effects are in line with the theoretical predictions of the 
multimodal approach found in Table 2. The first row of the first column 
shows that high defendant stakes decrease the probability of plaintiff 
31 Specifically, the effect of characteristic j is defined as 
((X'13) - 1(x 13), 
where XI = (XI, 2, . ,j-1, 1, j+ .....k) and X? = (X1, X2, .. . * j-1, 0, 
j+ 1, ... . ,X k), where X, is the fraction of cases in the sample with multimodal characteristic m. We obtained standard errors with the delta method. See id., sec. 7.6. 
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victory at trial for the average case by 3.8 percentage points, ceteris 
paribus: defendants with large amounts at stake in litigation settle with 
weaker plaintiffs more frequently than they otherwise would. In line with 
the theory, superior defendant information also decreases the probability 
of plaintiff victory at trial, by 7.3 percentage points. Mismeasurement 
and relatively high settlement costs result in deviations from the strict 50 
percent rule as well. Plaintiffs in cases in which disputes are more likely 
to be over damages are 6.0 percentage points more likely to be scored as 
winning at trial. And, as the divergent expectations model would predict, 
plaintiffs in cases with high settlement costs are 4.2 percentage points 
less likely to win at trial, all else being held constant. All of these effects 
are statistically different from zero at least at a 90 percent level of signifi- 
cance. 
Agency effects and high awards are the most important determinants 
of the selection of cases for litigation. A plaintiff in a case that is average 
except for divergences of interest between the plaintiff and the attorney 
due to the presence of a contingency fee contract is 13.7 percentage 
points less likely to win, holding other multimodal characteristics con- 
stant. This effect is statistically different from zero at a 99 percent level 
of significance. This finding provides evidence that clients, not lawyers, 
control the decision to litigate. If clients control the decision to litigate, 
then contingency fee contracts would be associated with increased litiga- 
tion and a lower probability of plaintiff victory at trial and on appeal; if 
attorneys control the decision to litigate, then contingency fee contracts 
would be associated with less litigation and a high probability of plaintiff 
victory. 
Surprisingly, the effect of high awards on the probability of plaintiff 
victory at trial is approximately as large as the effect of superior defen- 
dant information and agency effects combined. Plaintiffs in cases with 
high awards experience dramatically more success at trial than their oth- 
erwise similar counterparts: these plaintiffs are fully 20.0 percent more 
likely to win at trial, all else being constant. The fact that large stakes 
are associated with increased plaintiff victory at trial means that large 
stakes reduce the probability of litigation, all else being constant: in other 
words, large stakes encourage risk-averse parties to settle so as to avoid 
ending up a huge winner or loser. 
The second and third columns of Table 5 show the effect of each 
multimodal characteristic on the probability that the plaintiff-at-trial 
would win after appeals are completed and the probability of the appellant 
winning, respectively. Reestimating the multimodal model with these 
other dependent variables shows that the basic principles behind the re- 
sults presented in the first column are insensitive to the manner in which 
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"plaintiff victory" is defined. The signs of most of the multimodal effects 
remain the same across models with differently defined dependent vari- 
ables. In addition, the effect of high defendant stakes, high awards, and 
agency effects on plaintiff victory remain significant in at least one of the 
two alternative specifications. 
Other diagnostics support the validity of the multimodal approach. If 
the estimated probability of plaintiff victory for the baseline type of case 
(for example, a case with none of the seven multimodal characteristics 
that we analyze) in the multimodal model is closer to 50 percent than the 
probability of plaintiff victory in the raw data, then a multimodal ap- 
proach that controls for deviations from the assumptions behind the di- 
vergent expectations model helps to reconcile the 50 percent rule with 
the data. Calculations of the probability of plaintiff victory for the base- 
line case from the raw probit results in Appendix B32 show that control- 
ling for multimodal characteristics in fact brings the probability of plaintiff 
victory closer to 50 percent. The raw probability of plaintiff victory at 
trial is 26.9 percent (Table 3, col. 1), but the estimated baseline probabil- 
ity of plaintiff victory at trial is 39.3 percent, controlling for multimodal 
factors. Similarly, the raw probability of plaintiff victory after appeals 
(appellant victory) is 31.4 percent (27.3 percent), but the estimated base- 
line probabilities are 40.6 percent and 32.1 percent, respectively. Modi- 
fying the specification used in the estimation of the probit models also 
does not change the results substantially. For example, controlling for 
whether the United States was a party in the case only reduces the stan- 
dard error of the effect of the multimodal characteristic "law favors de- 
fendant." 
V. CONCLUSION 
In their 1984 article, Priest and Klein proposed the "50 percent rule": 
namely, that under a simple divergent expectations model of the decision 
to litigate, a selection effect would cause approximately half of litigated 
cases to be won by the plaintiff and half to be won by the defendant. 
Although recent empirical work has shown a selection effect in litigated 
cases, an extensive literature has found that the probability of plaintiff 
victory is generally less than 50 percent. 
This article investigates whether a "multimodal" approach to the selec- 
tion of cases for litigation can reconcile the validity of the selection hy- 
pothesis in general with observed win rates of less than 50 percent. The 
32 The baseline probability of plaintiff victory equals 1(a). 
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multimodal approach hypothesizes that violations of assumptions of the 
simple divergent expectations model affect the selection of cases for liti- 
gation, thereby driving the win rate away from 50 percent. 
Based on data from 3,529 cases decided by the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals between 1982 and 1987, we find that our approach explains 
win rates of less than 50 percent within the context of a divergent expecta- 
tions model. First and foremost, case characteristics associated with vio- 
lations of assumptions of the divergent expectations model affect win 
rates in the manner that simple law-and-economics models would predict. 
We examine seven characteristics of cases: differential stakes, differen- 
tial information, mismeasurement of plaintiff victory, legal standard fa- 
voring one side, settlement costs being high relative to litigation costs, 
high awards, and agency effects. All of these characteristics affects win 
rates in the manner that the theory would suggest, six out of the seven 
in a statistically significant way. 
Second, we find that controlling for multimodal characteristics brings 
the win rate closer to 50 percent. In other words, among cases that con- 
form more closely to the assumptions underlying the Priest-Klein model, 
the win rate is closer to 50 percent. Also, the data show that the 
multimodal approach applies in a similar fashion at each stage of the 
appeals process, further supporting its applicability. 
Thus, we argue that the best approach to understanding the selection 
of cases for litigation is a multimodal one, which does not rely on any 
single overarching theory to predict trial outcomes. Our article discusses 
a number of possible mechanisms that may drive case outcomes away 
from the 50 percent baseline, based on simple models. We attempt to 
consolidate the leading explanations for why outcomes deviate from 50 
percent in a general multimodal approach. 
We caution that our approach is only tentative. The effects we discuss 
find some support in the empirical evidence, but more documentation 
would be required before particular characteristics could be confidently 
identified as determining outcomes in particular classes of cases. More- 
over, there may well be other important mechanisms that we have not 
discussed that significantly influence outcomes.33 Our approach should 
be viewed as preliminary, although it provides a potentially valuable 
framework for further research. The task now is for researchers to engage 
in detailed investigation of selection effects in particular classes of cases 
33 For a discussion of several additional mechanisms, see Gross & Syverud, supra note 
24, at 380-84. 
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in order to understand the dynamic forces at play in individualized 
contexts. 
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APPENDIX B 
TABLE Bi 
PROBIT ESTIMATES OF EFFECTS OF MULTIMODAL CHARACTERISTICS 
(Standard Errors Are in Parentheses) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Plaintiff 
MULTIMODAL Plaintiff Win after Appellant 
CHARACTERISTIC Win at Trial Appeals Win 
hi-d-stakes -. 115* - .172** - .183** 
(.060) (.056) (.057) 
hi-d-info - .231** - .035 - .001 
(.080) (.077) (.080) 
mismeasure .180* - .028 -. 128 
(.107) (.104) (.109) 
law-favors-d - .143 - .134 - .087 
(.092) (.088) (.092) 
hi-set-cost -.133* - .088 -.117 
(.078) (.076) (.079) 
hi-award .583** .378** .223** 
(.076) (.073) (.075) 
agency - .399** -. 188** .017 
(.078) (.075) (.079) 
constant term - .269** -.239** -.465** 
(.060) (.059) (.060) 
log-likelihood - 1,923.5 - 2,136.9 - 2,047.2 
NOTE.-See Table 2 for definitions of multimodal characteristics. 
* Significant at the 90 percent level. 
** Significant at the 95 percent level. 
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